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How do auditors navigate conflicting logics in everyday practice?  
Historically professional logic has shaped accountancy, increasingly it has been shaped also by 
commercial logic. This study moves beyond these distinctions for a better and more nuanced 
analyses of how actors (Big 4 auditors) navigate conflicting logics in their everyday practice. 
The study follows a qualitative approach and is based on views of multiple role players in the 
audit process of complex companies in Australia, South Africa and the United Kingdom. The 
study examines auditors’ decision-making involving experts, rotating partners/firms and 
meeting regulatory inspection requirements. The study adds to the emerging debate around 
logic multiplicity at the institutional ‘coalface’ by showing that auditors use balancing 
mechanisms (segmenting, assimilating, bridging and demarcating) to navigate and make sense 
of coexisting (professional, commercial and accountability) logics. Views of non-auditor role 
players, mostly overlooked in by institutional research at micro-levels, challenge the 
institutionalisation of connected logics and question the influence on audit quality.  
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Historically, professional logic has shaped accountancy (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), 
embodying the core values of objectivity, integrity, independence and rigor. Professional logic 
justifies professional status, which carries a reciprocal obligation to deliver on the social 
contract by protecting the interests of the general public (Edgley, Sharma & Anderson-Gough, 
2016; Gendron, 2002; Lander, Koene & Linssen, 2013; Spence & Carter, 2014; Sikka, 2009; 
Suddaby, Gendron & Lam, 2009). In this paper, public interest is implicitly addressed by 
auditor independence and audit quality: “the higher the auditor’s independence is, the better is 
the auditing quality and therefore the more the public interest is served” (Malsch, Tremblay & 
Cohen, 2018, p. 8).  
 
Motivated by  higher profits (Brock, 2006), paralleled by escalating fee pressures and client 
demands for consulting services and value-adding assurance services, Big 4 firms have 
operated from an increasingly multinational commercial business model (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Lander et al., 2013; Sikka, 2009; Wyatt, 2004). They have reinvented 
themselves as multidisciplinary practices by expanding their offerings and recruiting a 
heterogeneous mix of professionals (Andon, Free, & O'Dwyer, 2015; Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006; Hanlon, 2004; Suddaby, Cooper, & Greenwood, 2007; Suddaby et al., 2009; Suddaby & 
Greenwood, 2005). Hiring experts from diverse professional backgrounds initiated still 
ongoing changes to cultures and institutional logics within Big 4 firms (Hinings, 2012; 
Suddaby et al., 2007; 2009). Big 4 firms’ drive privileges client interests, revenue generation 
and profit-seeking over wider public interests (Gendron, 2002; Picard, Durocher & Gendron, 
2014; Spence & Carter, 2014; Suddaby et al., 2009), demonstrating their commercial logic shift 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Sikka, 2009; Wyatt, 2004). 
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This study moves beyond the distinction of conflicting logics for a better and more nuanced 
analyses of how actors navigate conflicting logics in their everyday practice. Using interview 
data from multiple role players involved in the audit of large complex companies this study 
explains how Big 4 auditors navigate conflicting logics in their everyday work. The research 
question is: How do Big 4 auditors navigate institutional complexity in their decision-making 
to maintain audit quality on complex audit engagements, particularly to (1) involve experts, (2) 
rotate firm or engagement partners and (3) meet regulatory inspection requirements? This 
study’s main findings are: First, Big 4 auditors use balancing mechanisms (segmenting, 
assimilating, bridging and demarcating) to navigate between conflicting logics, and second, 
even though the connected logics made sense to individual auditors and were routinely enacted 
by them in everyday practice, some of the other role players (non-auditor stakeholders) 
remained sceptical about the institutionalization thereof and questioned the influence on audit 
quality.  
 
Institutional logics, “the key means by which social reality is reproduced and changed” (Martin, 
Currie, Weaver, Finn & McDonald, 2017, p. 104), is an established research field. Research 
initially regarded co-existing logics as a temporary phenomenon during transition times (Reay 
& Hinings, 2009),  while lately the continuous coexisting of conflicting logics  is found in 
many fields, such as accountancy, and such logic multiplicity influences all actors 
simultaneously (Greenwood et al., 2006; Lounsbury, 2007; 2008; Reay & Hinings, 2009, 
Martin et al., 2017). Most logic studies focus on macro-level changes (e.g., organizational 
responses), while interpretations at the micro-level have been largely ignored (Bévort & 
Suddaby, 2016; Smets,  Jarzabkowski, Burke & Spee, 2015).  While past studies at the micro-
level often used ethnographical approaches (Bévort & Suddaby, 2016; Smets et al., 2015) and 
offer in-depth understanding of single organizations or single organizational subunits, our 
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study augments the limited body of multinational work on logic multiplicity (Spence & Carter, 
2014) by analysing a multi-country data-set comprising the United Kingdom (UK), Australia 
and South Africa (SA). In addition, it expands qualitative research on multiple logics in the 
accountancy field (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lander et al., 2013; Suddaby et al., 2009), 
by including non-auditor stakeholder viewpoints. Thus, we obtained views of regulators and 
professional bodies (referred to as PB/R), audit partners (engagement partners (EP), talent 
partners (responsible for attraction, retention and development of staff) (TP)), and 
multidisciplinary experts within Big 4 firms (EX), and audit committee chairpersons (CACs), 
chief financial officers/directors (CFOs) and chief audit executives (CAEs) (heads of internal 
audit functions) of Big 4 firms’ multinational clients.  
 
This study addresses the vacuum on how institutional complexity is navigated at the ‘coalface’ 
of everyday work (Martin et al., 2017; Smets et al., 2015), thus focusing on everyday life 
“where the rubber of the theory hits the road of reality” (Barley, 2008, p. 358). The study 
expands on the model developed by Smets et al. (2015) to balance conflicting, yet 
complementary logics in practice. The study adds to the literature by showing that although 
auditors manage logic multiplicity in their everyday work, some non-auditor role players 
remained sceptical and questioned the influence of connected logics on audit quality. It points 
towards the temporal nature of the institutionalization of logic multiplicity even though the 
latter is routinely enacted within everyday practice.  
 
The next section of this paper outlines logic multiplicity as theoretical background. Thereafter, 
the investigative method used in the study is discussed, and the study’s findings are presented. 
These findings are then discussed; areas for further research are identified, and the researchers’ 
concluding thoughts presented.  
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Theoretical background  
In their seminal work Friedland and Alford (1991) identified the institutions central to 
contemporary Western capitalism (capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear 
family and Christian religion) which have shaped individual preferences and organisational 
interests. By arguing that these social institutions are potentially contradictory, recognises 
multiple logics in individuals and organisations.  
 
Institutional logics form overarching sets of principles that explain how actors interpret and 
function in social situations (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011), 
and thus explain how organisations and individuals behave (Lander et al., 2013), including 
creating “the rules of the game” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p. 112). Organisations are rarely 
dominated by a single logic (Lander et al., 2013): multiple and potentially conflicting logics 
usually coexist over extended time periods (Greenwood et al., 2011). A multiplicity of logics 
could be contested and fragmented by tensions between them (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; 
Edgley et al., 2016; Lounsbury, 2007; 2008). They can remain compartmentalised (segmented), 
be blended, selectively coupled (Pache & Santos, 2013) or assimilated when the core logic 
adopts some of the practices and symbols of a new logic (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). 
 
Recent studies demonstrate the existence of competing logics (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; 
Greenwood et al., 2011; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lander et al., 2013; Lounsbury, 2007; 
Pache & Santos, 2013; Reay & Hinings, 2009).  Most studies were done at the organizational 
level (Bévort & Suddaby, 2016; Smets et al., 2015), while those presenting a micro-level 
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perspective tend to focus on actors with clout and ignore lower-profile actors (Martin et al., 
2017).  By neglecting their interpretation of institutional logics at “coalface” level, a 
“somewhat ‘un-inhabited’ image of the organization” is portrayed in the literature (Bévort & 
Suddaby, 2016, p. 20). The few studies providing a micro-level perspective are not in the 
accountancy field (e.g. in healthcare (Andersson & Liff, 2018) and public welfare (Olakivi & 
Niska, 2017)). An exception is the longitudinal ethnographic study of Bévort and Suddaby 
(2016) reporting how individual accountants make sense of their new managerial roles and 
integrated professional and managerial logics. They found individuals were authors of varying 
identity scripts, thus showing reinterpretation of competing logics depends on individual 
interpretation (Bévort & Suddaby, 2016). Closer to this study is the ethnographic study of 
Smets et al. (2015) on reinsurance trading in Lloyd’s of London. The study developed a 
conceptual model comprising three balancing mechanisms (segmenting, bridging and 
demarcating) which allow individuals to manage competing logics in everyday practice. They 
found individuals segment work practices pertaining to competing logics by using structural 
arrangements. These allow individuals to enact coexisting logics separately.  
 
When individuals segment their work, they also introduce one logic into the performance of 
the other. They bridge logics by temporarily combining logics to exploit complementarities, 
thereby maintaining coexisting logics “as discrete so that they can feed off each other” (Smets 
et al., 2015, p. 35). Individuals use organizational peer-monitoring and self-monitoring 
structures to carefully examine their bridging practices, which Smets et al. (2015) label as 
demarcating, being activities that prevent “inadvertent logic blending or slipping” (Smets et 
al., 2015, p. 35). The three balancing mechanisms have a cyclical association; first by 
separating coexisting logics by segmenting practices, second by integrating co-existing logics 
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(bridging) where mutual benefits follow and third by counter-balancing when co-existing 
logics are “teased apart” or demarcated (Smets et al., 2015, p. 37). 
 
While the above covered a general discussion on logics, this study focuses on logics in 
accountancy. It explains multiple logics in Big 4 audit firms and expands on the Smets et al., 
(2015) model. A wide body of knowledge exists on  the distinct logic shift in accountancy, 
away from primarily professional logic, towards a more commercially driven logic 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Lander et al., 2013; Picard et al., 2014; Sikka, 2009; Suddaby 
et al., 2009).  Big 4 auditors are perceived to be privileging client interests and their own 
revenues over wider public interests (Gendron, 2002; Picard et al., 2014; Spence & Carter, 
2014; Suddaby et al., 2009) prioritising their own growth and profitability, and extending their 
global reach (Holm & Zaman, 2012; Malsch & Gendron, 2013), and are entering new audit 
spaces  (Andon et al., 2015). This commercial orientation necessitates reconfiguring firms’ 
identities, changing traditional practices, structures and values (Blomgren & Waks, 2015; 
Suddaby & Viale, 2011). Commercial logic, however, has not totally eclipsed 
professionalism’s historically demonstrated values/virtues of public duty, ethical conduct, and 
technical competence (Andon et al., 2015; Suddaby et al., 2009). Malsch and Gendron (2013, 
p. 880) recognise this duality as embodying “contradictory value clusters”.  
 
Previous research on logic multiplicity in the accountancy field only considered two logics 
(professional and commercial/managerial). Blomgren and Waks (2015) criticise this as a 
limitation, arguing that the degree of organisational complexity may be underestimated, while 
Greenwood et al., (2011) observe that particular responses may not have been fully understood. 
While the coexistence of several logics within organisations has been reported from other 
disciplines’ perspectives (Ollier-Malaterre, McNamara, Matz-Costa, Pitt-Catsouphes and 
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Valcour (2013) refer to the coexistence of strategic, benchmarking, and compliance logics in 
human resource practices), logic multiplicity within the audit environment has not previously 
been considered. This study introduces accountability logic which manifests in a compliance 
mind-set. 
 
Method  
This qualitative study focuses on Big 4 firms because of their innovative audit practices: 
regulations are first translated into practice here, and individual professional identities are 
formed (Cooper & Robson, 2006; Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009). Carter, Spence and Muzio 
(2015, p. 1204) regard the Big 4 firms as dominant in both “symbolic and material terms”, 
underscored by their global reach, and see them as worthy of study in their own (collective) 
right. Thus, the Big 4 firms present an ideal platform for this study.  The study draws on in-
depth interviews with key stakeholders, those directly or indirectly involved in the audit 
process, including non-auditor role players that have mostly been overlooked in by institutional 
research at micro-levels. 
 
Interview participants 
After obtaining prescribed ethics approval, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 
two broad groups of stakeholders in audits of the largest listed public companies in complex 
industries. Stakeholders are those who are directly involved in the audit process (auditors, 
corporate management, and the members of corporate audit committees); and those who have 
an oversight, public policy, or educative role in audit (regulators, standard-setters, Big 4 firms 
(as training institutions), professional accounting associations). Participants’ views include 
cognitive aspects (perceptions, thoughts, interpretations,) which are implicitly biased (Lander 
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et al., 2013). In this study triangulation was achieved by considering views of multiple 
stakeholders in Australia, SA and the UK. The researchers identified significant public 
companies1, each from a different industry and interviewed each company’s EP, CFO, CAC 
and CAE, generating a total of 84 interviews.  Table 1 identifies participants by country.  Two 
participants each chaired audit committees for two different global companies, and another 
participant responded as an IT expert and as his firm’s sustainability division head.  Thus, 84 
interviews effectively represent 87 role perspectives.   Table 2 identifies participants by 
industry.  
Table 1: Number of participants 
 
Table 2: Participants involved in the audit process classified by industry 
 
The interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were guided by questions informed by an extensive review of 
relevant literature and from feedback from the study’s funders.  Broad, “naturalistic” questions 
were posed to participants to elicit responses on relevant matters to interviewees (Alvehus, 
2015, p.35) (e.g. how do you see the role and responsibilities of auditors change in future, 
describe the perfect mix of competencies for a perfect engagement team to perform a high 
quality audit). After conducting a preliminary interview to verify the appropriateness of the 
questions and thereafter addressing suggested feedback, the 84 interviews were conducted in 
2013 and 2014. Each interview, lasting between 30 minutes and two hours (averaging 
                                                          
1 Six UK companies were chosen from the top 20, determined by market capitalisation; five SA companies were 
chosen from the JSE Top 40 index, plus a listed, South African managed, mining company; Australian  
companies were chosen from the top 100 by market capitalisation. 
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approximately one hour), was recorded and professionally transcribed and each participant had 
an opportunity to review their interview transcript and clarify/ amend any comments made 
during that interview. 
 
Analysis 
The transcribed interviews were manually analysed by one researcher, using Atlas.ti qualitative 
data analysis software.  The initial data analysis process involved identifying meaningful 
topics, categories and themes; attaching data units to the appropriate category; revising initial 
categories and reorganising data according to these revised categories; and developing and 
testing propositions and conclusions emerging from the data.  The analysis was independently 
reviewed by the other authors.  The data analysis was refined using “sensitising concepts” 
(Martin et al., 2017) from existing literature on institutional change. A more theoretical 
approach was followed to code the data according to the conflicting logic’s influence on 
participants’ decision-making. Through ongoing iteration between data and relevant literature 
(a first level coding proceeding to a second level coding),  logics emerged as conceptual 
categories. Also, patterns were identified that seem to underpin auditors’ choices for coping 
with conflicting logics during decision-making. Any differences of interpretation were 
discussed and resolved collectively. 
 
Findings  
 The findings of the study are presented in relation to auditors’ everyday practice. Three 
decisions made by auditors during complex audit engagements are considered, namely; (1) 
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involvement experts, (2) firm or partner rotation and (3) meeting regulatory inspection 
requirements. 
 
Involvement of experts 
Study participants identified today’s complex business environment as one demanding a more 
diverse audit skill set, the presence of which is an important determinant of audit quality. 
Delivering quality audits was perceived by EP participants as their ‘license to operate’ 
(Australian EP), and sacrosanct. All CFO participants recognised business transactions have 
become multifaceted, information has increased in volume and complexity and these changes 
demand industry-specific knowledge and skills that do not necessarily fall within traditional 
auditing. Auditors can no longer be ‘jack[s] of all trades’ (SA CAE): industry complexity 
demands multidisciplinary audit teams.  
 
All participants recognised escalating numbers of experts on audit teams, (usually in-house 
expert colleagues), who are present courtesy of expanding consulting divisions “[Another Big 
4 firm] have actually bought a firm of consulting engineers who are specialists in oil and gas 
and in mining“(UK EP). All EP participants confirmed they use in-house experts (often from 
the firm’s consultancy division, an integral part of the firm’s business model), and only look 
elsewhere if the expertise is not available in-house. The CFO participants welcomed the 
presence of in-house expertise, as this addressed concerns regarding consistency and 
confidentiality.  Some non-auditor participants remained sceptical, holding that this practice 
risked compromising audit quality: their in-house experts’ knowledge might not be the best 
available and although available to Big 4 firms’ audit teams experts direct involvement on 
audits is trumped by their income generating consulting work.  
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The presence of experts within audit teams triggered debate around their likely impact on audit 
quality, particularly in an audit-only firm. Arguments against audit-only firms include that such 
firms would forfeit direct exposure to the innovative benefits of non-audit consultancy 
assignments and accumulation of industry-specific knowledge. Similarly, staff retention would 
be more difficult without the diversity of career-enhancing opportunities currently afforded by 
Big 4 firms’ wider range of services. “I absolutely do not think that the Big 4 audit firms can 
exist and deliver the same level of quality in an audit only firm”  (Australian EP). Retaining 
full-time, but under-employed experts also have cost implications for Big 4 firms.  Arguments 
in favour of audit-only firms centred on the consultancy divisions (employing experts) that 
have already fundamentally changed the culture, and operational and financial/business models 
of firms. Experts increasingly joined firms at more senior levels and achieved partnerships 
without following ‘normal’ progress through industry ranks. It could demoralise the audit side 
of firms. Table 3 uses balancing mechanisms to frame participants’ perceptions on how they 
navigated logic multiplicity when deciding to use experts on large complex company audits.  
 
Table 3: Expert involvement: navigating logic multiplicity  
Firm or engagement partner rotation   
At the time of this study several regulators had already introduced mandatory auditor rotation 
at partner level, whilst others were considering rotation at firm level to demonstrate auditors’ 
professional independence and address familiarity issues. Participants from all cohorts also had 
strong views as to whether mandatory firm rotation was more effective than mere audit partner 
rotation, to demonstrate auditor independence. Those vigorously criticising and opposing firm 
rotation were mostly from the EP and CFO cohorts, arguing that audit failures occur more often 
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in the first year of the relationship than at any later stage. In addition to losing client-specific 
knowledge (potentially compromising audit quality), EP participants also maintained that 
mandatory audit firm rotation increases costs as new audit firms engage additional resources 
to obtain the required client-specific knowledge. CAE participants generally favoured audit 
firm rotation, while acknowledging its costly nature, and recognised that to build an optimal 
relationship takes time. However, the benefits of employing a different audit firm’s 
methodology include the re-exposure of problematic issues previously accepted as ‘normal’. 
 
Some participants generally recognised that mandatory firm rotation limits their income 
streams and some questioned whether such practice could achieve complete independence.  
Participants were variously concerned about the impact of firm rotation on the Big 4 firms 
specifically: client-specific business and industry knowledge were seen as optimising factors 
impacting audit quality and the audit’s effectiveness and efficiency. Table 4 uses balancing 
mechanisms to frame participants’ perceptions on how they navigated logic multiplicity when 
deciding to rotate firms or engagement partners.   
 
 
Table 4: Partner/firm rotations: navigating logic multiplicity  
 
Meeting regulatory inspection requirements  
The formal monitoring using practice reviews (‘regulatory inspections’ in this paper) as the 
regulatory oversight process formed part of EP’s everyday practice and they reported that 
regulatory inspections have increased in number and duration (“[The] level of scrutiny, and 
therefore accordingly, the rigor around what we do, has gone up exponentially over the years” 
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(Australian EP)). These participants conceded that regulatory inspections have had a positive 
impact on audit quality, implicitly benefitting public interests, but that they need to “manage” 
the process, thereby following a compliance mind-set to ensure audit efficiencies and quality 
are maintained. Regulatory scrutiny requires an accountability logic and detailed 
documentation (seen as driving compliance behaviour) the outcome of which has been the 
emergence of two parallel audits: a compliance-driven audit ensures ‘all the boxes are ticked’ 
and an assurance-driven audit, aims at expressing an opinion. A compliance-driven audit, 
complete with multiple checklists and accumulated documentation, anticipating regulatory 
inspections (accountability logic), was much criticised by various participants who perceived 
it as having become auditors’ primary focus.  
 
Various study participants have observed a compliance-orientated mind-set in trainee auditors 
that is inhibiting the development of their critical thinking skills and professional scepticism in 
particular: “It tends to put pressure on auditors to be so compliance focused that it actually has 
negative effects on their scepticism and so on” (Australian EP). Following an accountability 
logic with a compliance-driven approach also risks making the workplace uninteresting, 
jeopardising the profession’s recruitment of quality junior employees, and retention of senior 
audit partners and over the long term the audit itself could be compromised. Expanding on the 
Smets et al. (2015) model, Table 5 uses balancing mechanisms to frame participants’ 
perceptions on how they navigated logic multiplicity when meeting regulatory inspection 
requirements.    
 
Table 5: Regulatory inspections: navigating logic multiplicity  
 
Discussion 
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This study sought to understand how Big 4 auditors navigate conflicting logics in their 
everyday practice. Their firms did not buffer them from the influence of conflicting logics  
(Martin et al., 2017) and they had to integrate and adapt different logics (Bévort & Suddaby, 
2016). In examining auditors’ decision-making to involve experts, rotate partners/firms and 
meet regulatory inspection requirements, the study expanded the conceptual model of Smets et 
al. (2015) to balance coexisting logics. The study adds assimilating to the model’s three 
interrelated balancing mechanisms (segmenting, bridging and demarcating) (Smets et al., 
2015).  
Segmenting involves “those practices that use given organizational structures to allow 
individuals to enact coexisting logics separately, where and when appropriate, to protect them 
from scrutiny by, and loss of legitimacy with, referent audiences of competing logics” (Smets 
et al., 2015, p. 32 & 33). It resonates with compartmentalizing in institutional theory (Kraatz 
& Block, 2008; Skelcher & Smith, 2015). It is the initial step in the balancing cycle and 
separates coexisting logics by segmenting practices that enact them, by assigning different 
logics to different locations with different referent audiences (Smets et al., 2015). Our study 
shows segmentation occurs when auditors decide to involve experts located in their firms’ 
consulting divisions on large complex audits. They realised that boundaries between auditing 
and consulting services are increasingly blurred (Barrett, Cooper & Jamal, 2005). While 
consulting divisions coincided with commercial logic (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Sikka, 
2009; Wyatt, 2004), auditors’ decisions and processes to conduct quality audits were 
influenced by professional logic (Malsch & Gendron, 2013; Spence & Carter, 2014). Recent 
studies confirmed auditors rely significantly on their in-house experts (Cannon & Bedard, 
2015; Griffith, 2019).  
 
16 
 
Different organizational structures were not as evident when auditors decided on partner/firm 
rotation or met regulatory inspection requirements, as the core of professional logic remained 
while they adopted practices and symbols of a conflicting logic. Rather than segmenting, a 
selective incorporation of elements occurred. This is known as assimilation (Skelcher & Smith, 
2015) and resonates with selective coupling (Pache & Santos, 2013) and co-optation 
(Andersson & Liff, 2018).This study adds assimilation as balancing mechanism to the Smets 
et al. (2015) model. In the case of rotation, influenced by their core (professional) logic auditors 
sought to be perceived as independent and used knowledge of the client to avoid audit failures 
(quality audits). Their emphasis of cost implications rather than independence in the debate 
between firm or partner rotation highlights the tension between commercial and professional 
logics. It is also evident in recent studies focusing on firm rotation (Velte & Loy, 2018) and 
audit-only firms (Demirkan, & Demirkan, 2017). In similar vein, auditors conducted audits 
aimed at quality in serving public interest, but in parallel, they conducted compliance driven 
audits to meet regulatory inspection requirements. It therefore appears that regulatory 
inspections, instead of improving audit quality and strengthening professional logic, have 
precipitated accountability logic manifesting in a compliance mind-set into Big 4 firms’ 
operational mix.  
 
The primary focus is now on performing compliance-driven audits, complete with multiple 
checklists and accumulated documentation, anticipating regulatory inspections, and it may well 
compromise professional judgement and scepticism.  Failure to follow up on questionable 
responses (Hurtt, Brown-Liburd, Earley, & Krishnamoorthy, 2013), is simply compliance 
behaviour trumping quality auditing. This is a significant challenge: only those auditors 
actively exercising professional scepticism are likely to confront clients or to perform 
additional procedures when irregularities become apparent (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, 
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Shefchik & Velury, 2013). Despite this, participants used standardised tools, together with 
accountability logic, as a professional strategy to “strengthen professional trust and provide a 
sense of certainty” that still threatens auditors’ professional judgement (Ponnert & 
Svensson, 2016, p. 586). 
 
The second mechanism in the Smets et al. (2015) model is bridging. Being integrative, bridging 
imports important understandings gained from enacting one logic into the other (Smets et al., 
2015). It balances differentiating effects of segmentation, also through collaborative 
relationships (Reay & Hinings, 2009). For example, auditors used knowledgeable experts (who 
had been exposed to current practices through consultation) and embedded them in audit teams 
whilst expecting them to apply audit firm methodologies. This approach addressed auditee 
executive management’s concerns regarding consistency and confidentiality. Creating a 
mutually facilitative relationship (Kraatz & Block, 2008), the competing logics “feed off” 
each other (Smets et al., 2015,  p.35) as auditors not only supported their firms’ consulting 
divisions but they used them as valuable in-house training ground for prospective auditors.  
 
Bridging, or temporarily connecting logics, is also part of assimilation when including elements 
of competing logics (Skelcher & Smith, 2015). Alvehus (2015, p. 40) describes bridging as 
follows: “a logic is given another, relevant role, differing from its intended role”. Regulators, 
in promoting auditor independence and audit quality (implying public interest and 
demonstrating professional logic), have introduced mandatory auditor rotation at partner level 
(Jackson, Moldrich & Roebuck, 2008; Chi, Huang, Liao & Xie, 2009) and are promoting firm 
rotation. Auditors implemented elements of competing logics; they supported partner rotation 
and managed the process by in- and out-phasing of engagement partners to retain client-specific 
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knowledge and promote audit quality (Bandyopadhyay, Chen, & Yu, 2014; Jackson et al., 
2008), whilst balancing audit efficiencies and costs (clients’ and own long-term revenues). 
Whilst partner rotation facilitated that competing logics “feed off” each other (Smets et al., 
2015, p.35), this is not necessarily the case with firm rotation as income gets lost when a client 
is not retained. Except for audit committee chair and regulator participants, the general 
consensus was against firm rotation even though it increases independence by introducing fresh 
perspectives on audit engagements (lowering complacency) (Elder, Lowensohn & Reck, 
2015). Although empirical evidence assessing the merits of audit partner rotation is mixed 
(Jackson et al., 2008; Carey & Simnett, 2006; Chi et al., 2009), the general consensus of auditor 
participants was that such rotation was acceptable to address familiarity issues.  
 
Participants conceded that regulatory inspections (legally and regulatory-derived coercive 
pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Ollier-Malaterre et al., 2013)) have impacted positively 
on audit quality (Malsch et al., 2018) (underscoring accountability logic), but equally 
recognised that compliance behaviour is escalating (much criticised by some non-auditor 
participants). Regulatory agencies require detailed documentation to verify accountability and 
Big 4 firms use standardised tools to demonstrate their compliance. Auditors were expected to 
selectively act with a compliance mind-set and go beyond standard checklists to join 
compliance (tick-box) auditing and assurance auditing (based on evidence to express an 
opinion). Then accountability and professional logics could “feed off” each other (Smets et al., 
2015, p.35), otherwise the use of decision-making aids and checklists, increasing audit 
efficacies and minimising risks of failing inspections, negates professional development and 
could compromise firms’ ability to attract and retain competent staff, arguably impacting 
audit quality negatively (Holm & Zaman, 2012).   
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Smets et al. (2015) found that individuals use self- and peer-monitoring structures to scrutinise 
their bridging practices, thus demarcating logic blending or slippage. They argue that bridging 
carries the risk of privileging one logic over another, and tensions needed to be downplayed - 
thus demarcation restores balance according to relative power and interests (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006; Reay & Hinings, 2009). In this study audit quality served as demarcation and 
firms’ quality control processes, including peer reviews and independent regulatory 
inspections, represented institutionalised oversight processes (Holm & Zaman, 2012; 
Humphrey et al., 2009; Humphrey, Kausar, Loft & Woods, 2011; Khalifa, Sharma, Humphrey 
& Robson, 2007).  
 
This study shows auditors had the practical understanding to work across competing logics.  
Smets et al. (2015) argue that work can itself become institutionalized in the mundane, 
everyday practice of individuals. This study supports the notion, that auditors’ decisions to 
involve experts, rotate partners and align their audit work for regulatory inspections have 
become the norm in Big 4 firms, but such institutionalization was challenged by some non-
auditor participants, who questioned auditors’ commercial and accountability logics with 
compliance orientation and its impact on audit quality. They believed separating audit firms 
from consultancies could re-establish the “pure” professional firm identity (Noordegraaf, 2015) 
and saw Big 4 firms as having merely legitimise their consultancy-favouring business models 
by endorsing prevailing audit quality rhetoric, and thus protecting their images (Holm & 
Zaman, 2012). This finding points towards the temporal nature of institutionalization of logic 
multiplicity. It returns to the thinking of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that a single coherent 
institutional template is needed in order to gain support from external institutional referents.  
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The way in which actors reconcile logics deepen the understanding of institutional instability 
and change (Alvehus, 2015). This study enhancing the understanding of logic multiplicity at 
the institutional ‘coalface’ (Alvehus, 2015; Bévort & Suddaby, 2016; Smets et al., 2015). To 
answer the research question - How do Big 4 auditors navigate institutional complexity in their 
decision-making to maintain audit quality on complex audit engagements? – the study suggests 
individuals construct meaning of conflicting logics in ways that reflect, facilitate and promote 
their own aims and resources (Bertels & Lawrence, 2016) and they use balancing mechanisms 
to navigate and make sense of coexisting (professional, commercial and accountability) logics. 
While individuals have their own interpretation of institutional pressures, and use their own 
identity scripts to routinely enact them within everyday practice (Bévort & Suddaby, 2016), 
non-auditor participants in our study remained sceptical and questioned the influence of 
connected logics on audit quality. It points towards the temporal nature of the 
institutionalization of logic multiplicity and shows that institutional complexity is in continual 
flux (Greenwood et al., 2011).  
 
Concluding thoughts 
This paper has pondered the question: How do Big 4 auditors navigate institutional complexity 
in their decision-making to maintain audit quality on complex audit engagements? In particular 
it sought to understand auditors’ decisions to (1) involve experts, (2) rotate firms or engagement 
partners and (3) meet regulatory inspection requirements through an institutional logic lens. 
Adding to the emerging debate surrounding logic multiplicity at the institutional ‘coalface’, 
this study expands on the Smets at al. (2015) model of balancing coexisting logics. It adds 
assimilating to the other balancing mechanisms (segmenting, bridging and demarcating) 
auditors use to navigate and make sense of coexisting logics. While competing logics are in 
conflict at many points, they are paradoxically complementary (Gendron, 2002) in auditors’ 
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every day practice and through this interplay audit quality is maintained when these logics are 
balanced. However, non-auditor participants, mostly overlooked by institutional research at 
micro-levels, challenge the institutionalisation of connected logics and questioned the 
influence on audit quality. It shows that “the pattern of institutional complexity experienced by 
organizations is never completely fixed” (Greenwood et al., 2011, p. 318). 
 
Further work is needed to understand the relationship between audit quality (demonstrating 
professional logic) and accountability logic within audit firms. As Burns and Fogarty (2010, p. 
314) ask: ‘If inspections are causing more prescriptive audit procedures and generating a 
compliance mind-set, is that over the long term improving quality?’ Future studies should 
therefore investigate the current regulatory regime to answer the question: does the emergence 
of a checklist (compliance mind-set) approach to audit serve the best interests of audit quality?  
 
The interactions of multiple logics on audit firms’ competence and audit quality requires further 
research as competence is the essence of audit practice (Fogarty, Radcliffe & Campbell,  2006), 
and key to the profession’s survival  because ‘professions both create their work and are created 
by it’ (Abbott, 1988, p. 316). The emergence of new experts and new domains of expertise 
require examination in the context of understanding contemporary professional life confronted 
by multiple logics (Carter, Spence & Muzio, 2015). 
 
The study’s limitations include that data was derived from the personal experiences and 
perceptions of individuals with direct interests in the audit of complex, multinational 
companies. Investor perspectives therefore represent an area ripe for future research. 
Furthermore, the study’s multi-country analysis was limited to participants from the UK, 
Australia and South Africa. And finally, the study was based on Big 4 firm practices and little 
variation was found across the countries. This is not unexpected because  Big 4 firms are seen 
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as a field of study in their own right (Carter, et al., 2015, p. 1204). Future research could include 
cross-country studies on small-scale audit firms.  
 
More work needs to be done to understand the micro-level dynamics of institutional logics. We 
are encouraged by the applicability of the Smets et al. (2015) model in this study. However, 
with the addition of assimilation as a balancing mechanism, and the challenge of non-auditor 
participants in everyday practice being institutionalised, various avenues are opened up for 
future research to understand institutional pressures. 
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Table 1: Number of participants 
Cohort of participants Code Australia SA UK Total 
Engagement partners EP 2 8 7 17 
Chairpersons of audit committees CAC 2 5 3 10 
Chief financial officers CFO 6 6 3 15 
Chief audit executives CAE - 5 4   9 
Recruitment & training (talent) partners TP 3 11 4 18 
Professional bodies (including 
education/training directors), & regulators 
PB/R 4 3 2   9 
Experts EX - 6 -   6 
TOTAL 17 44 23 84 
2 
 
Table 2: Participants directly involved in the audit process classified by industry 
 EP CFO CAC CAE Total 
Energy sector 
UK 2  1 1 4 
Australia 1 2 1  4 
SA 1 1 11 1 4 
Telecom 
UK 1 1 12 1 4 
Diversified 
Australia  3 1  4 
SA 1 1 1 1 4 
Pharmaceutical 
UK 1 1   2 
Banking 
UK  1 1 12 1 4 
SA 2 1 12 1 5 
Insurance 
SA 1 1 1 1 4 
Retail 
UK 2  1 1 4 
SA 1 1 1 1 4 
Mining 
Australia 1 1   2 
SA 2 1 1  4 
Total 17 15 12 9 53 
                                                          
1 One UK and one SA chair of an audit committee participant served on two audit committees, but as views 
were obtained for both companies their participation are double counted the total is therefore twelve and not 
ten as reflected in Table 1. 
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Table 3: Expert involvement: navigating logic multiplicity  
 
Segmenting conflicting logics 
Experts are in the Big 4 
firms’ consulting divisions 
and have a commercial 
orientation (CL). 
Employing experts (many 
at a very senior level) has 
fundamentally changed the 
culture, and operational 
and financial/business 
models of firms (CL). 
Expert skills are required to 
perform quality audits of 
complex, multinational 
companies and improve 
audit quality (PL).  
 
Commercial logic (CL) Professional logic (PL) 
To say you could never recreate the audit-
only firm, I think is wrong. In fact it could 
be very attractive because it will be the 
auditors running their own business again, 
rather than just being a part of a much 
larger organisation where the [dominant] 
culture is very different (UK CAC).  
Many of them [experts] are in the 
consulting arms of the firms, and they do 
have their own fees that they chase, and 
their own clients (SA EP). 
I do find that some of the actuaries, 
especially if they operate in a professional 
services firm have more of an advisory hat 
on than an audit hat (SA EP). 
It would have been unbelievably 
exceptional for a big eight firm to have 
done a lateral hire at partner level. You 
would never have done that [30 years 
ago…] …Nowadays I would say 30% of 
the partners in big firms are lateral hires, 
not from [one of the] other big four but 
from all sorts of other organisations (UK 
CAC). 
One of the big concerns is that audit, which 
used to be the DNA of the organisation, is 
no longer (UK CAC). 
It [firm orientation] would depend on what 
the culture is within the firm: is it an audit 
firm or is it predominantly a consulting 
firm (UK CAE). 
That is a very different skillset to 
describing a company’s strategy. 
That is not what they're [auditors 
are] competent to do. They all have 
consulting arms that can come in 
and tell you how to do that; that is 
a different set of skills (UK CFO). 
I think we would obviously need 
different skills, in particular 
perhaps, skills that at the moment 
are more commonly associated 
with things like strategy 
consulting, and corporate finance, 
M&A advice, and forensic 
accounting review, such that you 
were thinking about things with 
different goals in mind (UK EP). 
The Big 4 firms have those skills, 
but more in their consulting 
divisions. It is a matter of being 
able to draw on and access those 
skills (UK CAE). 
 
Bridging commercial and professional logics 
 
Experts have to balance 
their consulting (CL) and 
audit support roles (PL) by 
utilising consulting 
opportunities to stay 
abreast of new 
developments.  
Using in-house experts is 
not only a viable business 
model for firms (CL) but 
assures client 
confidentiality and audit 
methodology consistency 
(PL) 
They’re [experts are] happy to do audit support for 23-40% of their time but they 
also want to do cutting-edge consulting (SA EP). 
If you try and only keep specialists [experts] there for the audit it’s not a viable 
business model (SA EX). 
So I think they’re [experts are] absolutely critical to contributing towards that 
audit (UK CAC).  
I'm not sure I want a lot of third parties wandering around; that doesn't make me 
feel very comfortable (UK CFO).  
You feel the weight of responsibility even more on an audit, so we would in our 
team meetings we would divvy out engagements, be they audit support or 
consulting, there’ll never be any prioritisation to say one is more important than 
the other (SA EX). 
Because consulting provides you with the opportunity to really stay abreast and 
to learn and understand what is going on in your industry …you are unable to 
maintain the true technical expertise if you only audit (SA EX). 
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Experts (many of them 
situated in consulting 
divisions) (CL) are 
embedded in 
multidisciplinary audit 
teams to provide special 
needs to maintain audit 
quality (PL)  
Auditor trainees could 
obtain valuable experience 
(PL) by being exposed to 
Big 4 firms’ consulting 
divisions (CL). 
With the input of specialists, which is absolutely fundamental, there is no single 
thing that I think [adds more] to audit quality, than having the right people 
involved in the team.  By and large, that [is the] very specialist expertise we 
incubate in our non-audit part of our firm (Australian EP). 
We use valuation experts but those are often people that are not trained auditors 
…to tell them how to document things in an audit file and to apply our global 
audit methodology is quite an education process (SA EP). 
If you want to improve audit quality and improve the trust in the profession, all 
those things, then you want to have many more multidisciplinary teams rather 
than having to use your network to go and track down people when you need 
someone (UK EP). 
So we will second them [auditor trainees] to consulting or to tax or to risk 
advisory or to forensics or to corporate finance.  Just to let them see other 
business within [the Big 4 firm] and broaden their experience (SA TP). 
Demarcating connected logics 
 
A regulator participant 
questioned auditors’ usage 
of experts on audits – it 
reinforces the need to 
analyse expert needs on 
audits (PL) to meet 
regulatory requirements. 
An audit committee chair 
participant questioned the 
depth of expert knowledge  
– it reinforces the need to 
analyse expert needs (PL) 
on audits to meet audit 
committee oversight 
expectations. 
The question that flows from that is, ‘How many of them [experts] ever spend 
any time near an audit?’ Because I don’t argue that they [Big 4 firms] have 
expertise, for example they do in the actuarial world, but you tell me how much 
time they spend on the audit (UK PB/R). 
A lot of the firms will claim to have expertise, i.e. they have people that would 
appear to have qualifications in these areas. The big challenge for the user is you 
may have people that seem to have qualifications in this particular field, but how 
deep is the experience? (UK CAC). 
We have an engagement quality review partner …on these big assignments, it’s 
always been there, but the auditing standards prescribe, prescribe it now, 
especially for U.S., the PCOB auditing standards has a specific standard on 
engagement quality review partners.  Then internationally, again my clients, I 
have a SEC filing review partner as well (SA EP) 
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Table 4: Table 4: Partner/firm rotations: navigating logic multiplicity  
 
Assimilating conflicting logics 
Rotation has merit to 
improve independence (PL) 
Firms incur huge 
investments  in social capital 
(and also in specific 
industries) and to have a 
return they need to retain 
audit clients (CL) 
 Efficiency and cost 
implications as well as 
securing a long-term revenue 
stream from retained audit 
clients (CL) are important 
features in the audit firm 
rotation debate 
 
Commercial logic (CL) Professional logic (PL) 
There is an efficiency premium from 
sticking with the one firm and even the 
one partner but, you know, independence 
is so incredibly important as well so 
there is a trade-off and, at some point, 
companies probably should muscle up to 
[take] the decision (Australian CFO). 
I don’t think [firm] rotation is necessarily 
the answer…I also think that the goal is 
being missed, if anything, it dilutes it 
long term, short term sure, everyone gets 
to eat from the pie, you know, but the 
Robin Hood theme doesn’t work in a 
capitalist world, it just doesn’t, we’ve 
also got to make profit (SA TP) 
So for firm rotation …[to] be there for 
ten years and then you rotate, give the 
firm the opportunity to invest in all the 
skills required and get a return on that 
investment because …we [audit firms] 
are not there for love and charity.  We 
also need to make a living so you cannot 
just invest all the time (SA EP). 
If we have five to seven year rotations, 
then the institutional knowledge that a 
Big 4 firm has …systems, processes, 
controls, history, legal structure and 
everything, [its] very, very difficult to 
see how a global firm can recreate that, 
and consequently, I suspect we will see 
more audit failures; certainly at 
subsidiary level, we will (UK EP). 
Familiarity does breed contempt 
(UK EP).  
Rotation is seen as one of those key 
things to embed independence… I 
am supportive of rotation but just 
the period needs to be reasonable, 
because you do get, you do get 
stale and complacent (SA TP),  
I’ve been involved in audits that 
I’ve done for years and years and 
years, and have also won some 
large audits and had to transition 
them from other firms. There’s no 
doubt in my mind that if you do 
that transition effectively then I 
think the company can achieve a 
better quality audit, certainly for 
two or three years, than they were 
perhaps getting from the firm 
who’d done it for 20 years (UK 
EP). 
Individuals [have] to demonstrate 
their independence but I think the 
people in general that is in this 
profession and the leadership roles 
understands that their bread and 
butter is dependent on their 
integrity …It comes back to the 
question of rotation …the concept 
makes sense SA TP) 
 
Bridging commercial and professional logics 
Partner rotation, rather than 
firm rotation, is the preferred 
alternative to demonstrate 
auditor independence (PL). 
By rotating the engagement 
partner, the firms retain the 
client (CL) 
Difficulties are encountered 
when embedding knowledge 
of the business and 
Yeah, well, rotating the partner is less onerous than rotating the firm.  So we 
are rotating partners  …It means that really you get four years, or three and a 
half years for a partner on their own.  Because in their first year they’re 
piggybacking off the old partner and in their last year they’re teaching a new 
partner.  So they have to have overlaps at the beginning and end, so really the 
partners are really only their own for three years out of the five (Australian 
CFO).  
I think partner rotation is good.  You know, I don’t believe in firm rotation, so 
I think partner rotation’s sufficient.  And the reason being, is the complexity of 
clients …[before joining the audit team] you don’t have a clue what, what’s in 
a massive company, you don’t know. So it takes, it takes a lot of time.  So on 
6 
 
specialised knowledge of the 
industry for newly acquired 
audits, and audit quality 
could be undermined when 
audit teams lack client-
specific or industry 
knowledge (PL) 
It allows firms to share 
knowledge of the client and 
deliver quality audits (PL), 
whilst ensuring a return on 
investment made to service 
the client (skills, time etc.) 
(CL). 
the partner rotation; I think it’s just how you manage it. I’m on this client for 
at least five years, and then you’re on the next five years, then I’m on the next 
five and so on (SA EP).  
I would be very reluctant for firm rotations for the simple reason that even 
within a firm I think at least when a partner rotates you have the audit managers 
and the clerks fairly familiar with it. If you have a firm rotation, I think it would 
probably take three-four years before clerks and managers and partners come 
to grips with it (SA CFO). 
Rotation was seen as one of those key things to embed independence.... it will 
take you five years just to understand …[a specific client in a complex industry] 
let alone really get your arms around it. And then, if I’m rotating in two years’ 
time on these big clients, you bring in someone that will mirror or get to know 
the client.  So when his five years starts ticking, he already knows the client. 
(SA EP). 
As a consequence [of audit rotation], you’re going to see, in my view, a 
different style of audit, because there is little point in doing a fantastic audit – 
if I define ‘fantastic audit’ as one that management thinks really adds a lot of 
value – there’s no prizes for doing that. You can’t retain the client, and you 
can’t win any additional revenues (UK EP). 
I think the firm rotation I think there is a certain amount of risk no matter how 
much effort you put into the one and…you do not know that client as well as 
somebody that has been on it for a number years. I think partner rotation is a 
good thing …we will try and keep the same partner and manager and then your 
second year following your third year of assignment so that you have a 
continuity so that people understanding the assignment (SA TP). 
Demarcating connected logics 
Firm processes, including 
quality control processes, 
need to ensure independence 
is maintained (PL) - – it 
reinforces the need to 
monitor partner 
independence on audits (PL) 
to meet regulatory 
requirements.  
It’s not necessarily about rotation of auditors.  It’s about closeness to the client 
and the ability and willingness to challenge the client, knowing that ultimately 
they’re paying your salary.  So there has to be recognition and processes within 
a firm to make sure that no client is bigger than the firm and we’ve seen Enron 
is the ultimate example where a client was bigger than the firm and therefore 
caused this demise (Australian EP). 
I’m therefore not a big supporter of rotation, definitely not firms, I can sort of 
see the benefit of partner rotation …though [you need] quality control process 
(SA EP). 
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Table 5: Regulatory inspections: navigating logic multiplicity  
 
Assimilating conflicting logics 
 
Regulation in the audit 
environment has 
improved audit quality 
(PL). 
Audit work is shaped by 
regulatory inspections; 
auditors are becoming 
compliance driven 
(AL) and this could be 
to the detriment of audit 
quality.   
Two audits are running 
in parallel. The one 
requires a compliance 
mind-set to meet 
regulatory inspection 
requirements and 
demonstrate 
accountability (AL). 
The other is conducting 
a quality audit in public 
interest (PL). 
 
Accountability logic (AL) Professional logic (PL) 
The quality question then comes back to 
…checklist auditing because the only way that 
you can make sure a quality audit  is delivered 
[based on regulatory inspections] is to make 
sure that everything has been done and the 
only way that you do that is to have checklist 
on checklist on checklist on checklist (SA TP). 
So the emphasis of the regulator, I think, 
drives us away from audit quality, not towards 
it. It drives us into lots of detailed 
documentation and away from talking to the 
client, understanding exactly what’s going on 
in the business, asking the right questions (UK 
TP). 
Tick, tick, tick.  And it can distract them 
[auditors] from what is really, what really 
matters (Australian CFO). 
The last time I counted, on an audit for a large 
company we had something like 124 
checklists to complete. It’s frightening (UK 
EP). 
They [auditors] are all spending more of their 
time doing … box ticking and arse covering… 
that’s the reality (UK CAE). 
The advent of a compliance regime and audit 
inspections (all of which are absolutely right), 
create this compliance mentality (UK CAC).  
A lot of regulations actually result in a 
compliance auditor where they tick boxes and 
they can’t think … and they don’t exercise 
judgment or professional scepticism (SA EP). 
The regulatory environment has 
certainly improved the quality of 
the audits, and I do think we are 
doing better audits since we've 
been regulated and have had 
regulatory inspections (UK EP).   
It definitely influences what our 
regulator thinks is important. 
Influences how we look at quality 
…The impact of having a regulator 
that reports publicly on our 
findings, only ramps up the 
pressure on quality further (UK 
TP). 
 
 
 
Bridging accountability and professional logics 
Accountability towards 
regulators resulted in 
increased compliance 
behaviour. Two parallel 
audits are performed 
that need to be 
connected, thus also 
connecting the logics 
… there are definitely two audits going on (UK EP). 
I think the way the world is structured presently, you need loads of technical 
accountants and regulatory compliance people and that’s it (UK CAE). 
The process and the risk management approach within the firms is so around 
compliance, with the firms [using] prescribed methodologies and ensuring that 
everything is religiously completed as it should be (SA CAC). 
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underlying these audits 
(AL & PL) 
When connected, 
standard checklists and 
programmes do not 
disappear (AL) but 
more is needed to go 
beyond the minimum 
and perform a quality 
audit (PL) that meet 
regulators’ 
requirements 
Thus the regulator 
should not be the main 
stakeholder (AL) but 
audit quality should 
prevail (PL) 
 
It can be quite a struggle to get those two [compliance and assurance audits] to be 
properly joined up (UK CAC). 
Do you have standard checklists and audit programs and so forth? …I think the 
answer is you still need something to make sure that those who aren’t thinking do 
the minimum, but you want people to think beyond that, and it’s actually up to the 
firms because it’s really about things like supervision and review.  You know the 
partner involved with the staff, the mentoring, all of those sorts of things, training 
people up to think beyond the box (Australian PB/R). 
From an audit quality perspective, is to focus on what matters most, as opposed to 
making sure my file is squeaky clean … Your client never sees the audit file.  The 
only person who sees the audit file is the regulator.  And I come back to the point I 
made earlier on - … we’ve got the wrong stakeholder in mind here.  (SA EP). 
Demarcating connected logics 
Regulator inspection 
processes should 
remain  and need to be 
driven by audit quality 
(PL) – it reinforces the 
need to independently 
monitor audit quality 
(PL). 
Firms’ own quality 
control processes (PL) 
need to address 
shortfalls in audit 
quality (PL) and firms’ 
remuneration policy 
should be driven by 
audit quality (PL)  – it 
reinforces the need to 
pro-actively monitor 
audit quality (PL). 
By having audit inspections and we would say quite to the contrary that we’re 
actually trying to encourage auditors to think about the judgment issues, the big 
issues in an audit and to think beyond the requirements and the standards 
(Australian PB/R). 
Ultimately where there have been audit failures or where there has been poor 
auditing is picked up by the [specific regulator] (UK CAE) 
I see that all the time. The more you drive box-ticking, the more that becomes the 
defence, which is, “I did what I had to do; I did what was required of me.” You 
say, “Yes, but the bad thing happened” (UK CFO). 
So it’s making sure that our remuneration policy is not compromised and that all our 
monitoring activities, make sure we are monitoring audit quality and more 
importantly addressing where we believe there are shortfalls (SA EP). 
 
 
